This article intends to discuss the reach of international responsibility of states when acting under the mandate of an international organization. More specifically, it argues on the role of Nigeria when taking action under ECOWAS, a sub-regional organization, within the internal disturbances that occurred in Liberia and Serra Leone in the 1990s, in which triggered a humanitarian crisis that demanded intervention. Therefore, it will describe the intentions and actions carried out by Nigeria under an ECOWAS' mandate in order to try distinguishing Member State's responsibilities from the organizationitself, as it could reflect on the liability of such party for any international law violations carried out under peacekeeping operations. After all, if any abuse is currently foreseen, the (regional) international organization is the one held responsible, even if there was a clear abuse of its legal personality by the State. Thus, at the end, this article tries to reveal a need for a change in the understanding of international organization responsibility whenever a party is acting solely by its interests -as in the case of Nigeria -in order for it to be held liable.
Introduction
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a subregional organization created under the auspices of the United Nations Charter (UN Charter), has played a challenging role in Western Africa for a long time. Under its Treaty provisions, it has established the necessity to encourage, foster and accelerate the economic and social development of the States in order to improve the living standards of their own peoples.
However, conflict situations are still concrete and most of the time undermining real efforts to bring peace to Africa. Additionally, many States' private agendas have taken place over the Organization's common decisions, as it was the case of Nigeria, an ECOWAS Member State, in Sierra Leone in 1991. In view of selfinterests involved it is arguable whether interventions by such organizations are truly aimed at the rescue of African States or, as in the case of Sierra Leone, serve as a means for actors to privately achieve results and promote them as their own goals.
In this venue, main inquiries in this article willaddress the role of the subregional organizations in Africa, as well as what is still needed to ensure that the organizations' initial commitments be maintained. It will also consist of a discussion on the way to identify and distinguish Member States from the organizations themselves when their conducts generate separate responsibilities. The article will be focused on such issues based on international law doctrine, study of cases, treaties and state practice.
ECOWAS is a regional agency composed by fifteen countries, founded in 1975.
14 Originally, it was an economic organization, created to promote vast economic integration among its members. 15 In the beginning, it was not even involved with peacekeeping operations, but only with the self-defense of its Members. 16 ECOWAS has the goal of maintaining regional peace and security in its region. 17 The evolution of its treaty structure 18 demonstrates its reaction to a series of threats to regional peace and security -a response mechanism that has been widely lauded by the international community. 19 Nevertheless, after a coup d'état in Liberia and a civil strife, ECOWAS established a Ceasefire Monitoring Group(ECOMOG)aiming at restore stability in that State. 20 In short, in 1993 its constitutive instrument was revised creating a framework of "regional peace and security observation system and peace-keeping forces". May 28, 1975 May 28, , 1010 ECOWAS has undertaken classic peacekeeping operations, involving the use of force within the sovereign jurisdiction of one of their member states, at times without prior Security Council authorization and at times in coordination with the Council. 22 In the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security (ECOWAS Peacekeeping Protocol), ECOMOG is charged with a peacekeeping role but also bestowed upon it the mission of humanitarian intervention. 23 Accordingly, "ECOWAS shall inform the United Nations of any military intervention undertaken in pursuit of the objectives of [the ECOWAS Peacekeeping Protocol]" in accordance with Chapters VII and VIII of the Charter. 24 However, it does not state that ECOWAS-ECOMOG will seek Security Council authorization before undertaking peacekeeping or humanitarian intervention. 25 Although it is not the main discussion that we are triggering here, as anevolutionary step in international peacekeeping, it is imperative to note that the practices of regional organizations must bereconciled with the United Nations framework and related aspects of jus ad bellum. 26 Concerning the approval of the Security Council for the resort to the use of force in interventionist situations, some scholars have argued both in favor of the approval 27 and against such requirement, deeming not necessary the Council's involvement.
Regional and sub-regional organizations tend to have specific advantages over actors from outside these regions. They often have a greater interest (than external actors) in the affairs of their surrounding areas, and a desire to manage conflict in their regions. It is unlikely, for instance, that member states of the Organization of the American States (OAS) would have a deeper interest in the resolution of conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia or in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), than the Organization of African Unity (OAU) or other African sub-regional organizations.
29
A second crucial advantage that regional and sub-regional actors possess is that they often have a superior knowledge of their regions, the prevailing cultures, the peoples, and their idiosyncrasies. However, within these strengths lie the inherent weaknesses of regional actors. They will not always be objective, neutral and impartial, given the fact that they may have vested interests in the resolution or course of a conflict in their surroundings.
Unfortunately this is a common fact when related to individuals or group actors, whether they are acting alone or under the umbrella of an organization. And, as a result, their credibility may be questionedwhen they respond to conflict or crises in their backyard. By May 1990 the NPFL controlled significantly more territory than Doe's collapsing regime, which had lost effective control of the state, holding only the capital city, Monrovia.
31 Liberian Armed Forces suffered enormous losses on the battlefield, which led Doe to make an appeal on July 14 th , 1990 to ECOWAS in order to introduce a peacekeeping force into Liberia to "forestall increasing terror and tension" (i.e., to restore his decrepit government to power).
32
Although the decrease of international and domestic legitimacy of Doe's government, on August 7 th of that same year, under the scrutiny of the 13th summit of the Heads of States of ECOWAS countries, initiated by Nigeria, the member states decided to set up a five-member Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) 33 with the task of achieving a peace agreement in the Liberian civil war. The five members of the SMC took an unprecedentedstep in deciding to send a multinational peacekeeping force into Monrovia. 34 And ECOMOG was then established to "restor[e] law and orderto create the necessary conditions for free and fair elections." , 1994, p.38 34 It is important to highlight that this was an unprecedented step as ECOWAS' Constituting Treaty of 1975 and the Non-Aggression Protocol of 1978 did not foresee any regional security mechanism, which would permit any action to be taken within an internal conflict. The only treaty that had a slight approach to this matter was the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defenceof 1981 that prescribed on its Article 18 the possibility of threats to peace and security being assessed by the interested member-States. As early as October 1990, the neutrality and peacekeeping nature of ECOMOG was in question especially when it was seen assuming a combative role in alliance with conflicting actors (INPFL and AFL). 36 Moreover, individual member states harbored different reasons for wanting to intervene and assist the various warring parties to the conflict. Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire (along with Libya), for instance, were said to have given Charles Taylor some support (arms supply and training).
37
Nigeria was also partly motivated to intervene because of the attacks on foreigners, especially Nigerians in Liberia. 38 Beyond such concerns, the Liberian conflict has provided Nigeria with the opportunity to establish itself as the most influential mediator in the sub-region. Its role in the conflict and the perception that it was using Liberia as a means of exacting its dominance in the sub-region has been a source of contention among the member states, in particular the francophone states. 39 The decision of intervention in Liberia was criticized 40 and some members of ECOWASwere opposed to the idea of sending in a peacekeeping force into Liberia. The Burkinabe Head of State and Government was reported by Radio Burkina to have sent a message to the ECOWAS Chairman of Gambia, declaring his country's 'total disagreement' with the operation and adding that ECOMOG had 'no competence to interfere in member states' internal conflicts, but only in conflicts breaking out between member countries.
41 Côte d'Ivoire too was believed to be opposed to the initiative, which they saw as being largely advanced by Nigeria 42 Both countries were suspicious of Nigeria's intention.
Togo, a member of the SMC, initially announced that it would 'refrain from intervening' and making troops available for ECOMOG 'until the three factions agreed to the mediatory mission. 43 The opposition to the deployment of ECOMOG has raised fears that the age old rivalry between the anglo and francophone countries would be rekindled. Thus, in an attempt to reduce the tension, Nigeria initially conceded the leadership of the force to Lt. General A. Quainoo of Ghana in order to avoid giving any impression that they wanted to dominate ECOMOG's operation. 44 The UN Security Council did not manifest itself on the Liberian conflict until five months after the struggle had started within the territory, and even after ECOMOG's had taken action. On November 19 th , 1992, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 788calling for the restoration of peace and a complete weapons embargo against Liberia, and authorizing ECOWAS to (re)enforce its terms, as it determined that all States should respect the measures adopted by this organization to settle the conflict. 45 Ten months later, on September 22, 1993 , the Security Council adopted Resolution 866,which called for the creation of the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), stating "that this would be the first peace-keeping mission undertaken by the United Nations in co-operation with a peace-keeping mission already set up by another organization, in this case the ECOWAS." ECOMOG's troops, comprised largely by Nigerians, remained active in Liberia. 47 After seven years of mixed results and alternating between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, elections were held in Liberia, in which the leader of the main warring faction (Charles Taylor) emerged victorious. The remaining troops from the ECOMOG force then left Liberia in October 1999. 48 Despite their advantages, regional hegemons may themselves become stumbling blocks in a conflict resolution process if they are seen as being partial, as per having too many vested interests in the conflict, or, indeed, if they are not allencompassing in their approach.
49
In Sierra Leone interests played an important role once again. In 1997, the constitutional government of Sierra Leone was seized and overthrown by revolutionary forces that did not accept the results of the elections that had occurred in 1996, after years of uncertainties. 50 The In response to Kabbah's request, on May 26, 1997, Nigeria (not ECOMOG) sent forces to Sierra Leone. 55 Nigerian warships commenced heavy shelling of the capital city,Freetown,specifically targeting rebel-held locations. Ultimately, military effortsfailed, and Nigerian troops were forced to withdraw, 56 however later they were able to push back therebels and secure sections of the country.
57
In such unilateral intervention by Nigeria, there had been neither consultation with other ECOWAS leaders nor any vestige of evidence of an ECOWAS decision in favor of military intervention.
58 ECOWAS only acted on August 30 th , 1997, when it decided to intensify the embargos to Sierra Leone and to authorize ECOMOGs action to restore peace and security in the territory.
59
Although the international community did not reject the intervention, the UN Security Council did not authorize the actions within Sierra Leone. 60 The first pronunciation of the Council only took place on October 8 th of that year, when it adopted Resolution 1132, whichdeplored the coup and the junta's unwillingness to restore the"democratically elected Government" and constitutional order. The UNSC also supported ECOWAS efforts to restore Kabbah'sgovernment to power. At last, the only mandate the sub-regional force (ECOMOG) had from ECOWAS was to enforce an embargo on Sierra Leone.
61
West Africans attempted to negotiate an end to the RUF's illegitimate regime. In October 1997 a peaceagreement (The Conakry Agreement) for Sierra Leone was signed and a six-month timetable settled for its implementation. Under the agreement, rebels were to begin demobilizing and disarming immediately, and Kabbah was to be restored as President of Sierra Leone no later than April 22, 1998. By late 1997, however, it became clear that the peace process was not progressing according to schedule.
63 On February 13 th , 1998, with two months remaining for the implementation of the Conakry Agreement, Nigerian troops, now acting nominally under ECOMOG's mandate, captured Freetown, and ousted the junta'sgovernment, marking the end of a nine-day full military offensive. 64 Sierra Leoneans welcomed Nigeria's intervention and reacted with joy to the overthrow of the junta's regime. 65 After the intervention, the Liberian Foreign Minister was critical about the action, claiming that "[they would] support UN Resolution [1132] and the decision taken by ECOWAS", that is, "(…)that no use of force is authorized in Sierra Leone whatsoever, and we [Liberia] support that decision". 66 Nonetheless, it is clear that the Nigerian military commandeered the mandate and turned it into its private agenda. 67 In fact, the evidence strongly suggests that Nigeria qua Nigeria had carried out the military operation unilaterally and precipitately since ECOWAS leaders, who should have met almost immediately following the coup, did not in fact meet until August 30 th , three months after the first Nigerian bombardment. 68 Despite these facts, OAU welcomed Nigeria's actions almost immediately. 69 The UN Security Council issued a statementwelcoming "the fact that the military junta has been brought to anend" and commended "the important role" that the ECOWAS playedin the "peaceful resolution" of the crisis."
On March 16 th , 1998, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1556, welcoming Kabbah's return to power and partly terminating the sanctions imposed by Resolution 1132.
71
It is important to notice that regional forces tend to reflect existing political tensions, especially in the case of the African continent.Nonetheless, the proper definition of the mandate of the sub-regional force in Sierra Leone should be better addressed, especially because the concept underpinning the creation of ECOMOG remains valid, and though limited in objectives, its accomplishments such as in restoring Liberia to peace, have been widely acclaimed.However, as for the subregional forces in Sierra Leone, Nigeria's command over the intervention was well confirmed, 72 and the operation's credibility had commonly been tied to Nigerian credibility. 
Member States and Organizations' Conduct: Addressing Responsibilities at the Decision-Making Process
Since international organizationspossess legal personality, they bear rights and duties under international law, and can be held responsible if found in breach of these obligations. 74 International organizations have the ability to commit wrongful acts given their mandates, scope and influence. 75 The Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations by the International Law Commission ('ILC Articles') are a valuable source for addressing matters concerning responsibilities of international organizations, demonstrating the reasoning of remarkable publicists of international law in the matter. Accordingly, " [t] he conduct of an organ of an international organization(…) shall be considered an act of that organization under international law, whatever position the organ or agent holds in respect of the organization." 76 For an international organization to be held responsible for a wrongful act, it must have been perpetrated under real and exclusive operational control of the organization. 77 It is not "a question of who exercises operational command and control over the force; […] the more important enquiry is who exercises overall authority and control over the forces". 78 Thus, international responsibility is linked with operational command over activities. 79 Member States are secondary authorities of an international organization, acting as its organs or officials, and their conduct is attributable to the organization if committing internationally wrongful acts. 80 There are situationswhere Member States can be held responsible for an act formally committed by an international organization that would constitute a wrongful act of the States if committed by them.
Nonetheless, such exceptions fail to address the cases where member states abuse the legal personality of international organizations through the exercise of overwhelming control over the decision-making process of the organization. 82 It has been approached that accountability structures applicable to international organizations 83 should take into account the extent of control by member states over the process leading to the wrongful act of those international organizations. Accordingly, "(…) member states can no longer hide behind the screen of the international legal personality of the organizations" 84 and joint or concurrent responsibility of the member states should be envisaged under international law. After all, there is a […] risk that States will resort to the organizations they constitute as a comprehensive means to avoid responsibility for what, in truth, are their own initiatives. 85 In fact, States necessarily exercise some form of control on the decisionmaking process of an international organization, however,it may become problematic if it undermines the autonomy of the organization.
Moreover, the balance of power within an organization can be decisive as regards the possibility of an abuse of its legal personality.
If an international organization is composed of several powerful members states whose stands usually differ from one another, it is improbable that one of them will be able to sway the decision-making process, however within the framework of small regional organizations such as ECOWAS, that are dominated by one or two member states, an abusive control is more likely since the dominant state/s will find itself less restrained and will be prone to exercise overwhelming control. 87 Additionally, the "shield" offered by the exclusive responsibility of the international organization in most of the cases might encourage states to intervene in the decision-making process of the organization by making it pass the decisions that serve their interests. 88 This "instrumentalization" of international organizations is appealing because it shields states from being held responsible for conducts, affecting, consequently, the core reason for the existence of an organization, that is: to be an appropriate framework to discuss and regulate substantive international issues. 89 Thus, the abuse of legal personality at such level should be better addressed by the ILC, which demands a reconstruction of the provisions of its Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, or, at least, a better interpretation in order to avoid cases like the ones before mentioned in Africa. 
Conclusion
This article has tried to argue about the role of ECOWAS (and Nigeria) within the internal disturbances that occurred in Liberia and Serra Leone in the 1990.
Firstly, it tried to set out the limits of this regional international organization in terms of its purposes and its crescent role as one of Africa's main agency to maintain peace and security during times of emergency created by coup d'états. After all, the situations that such countries faced required a more incisive intervention in order to avoid a massive violation of human rights and humanitarian law.
Secondly, this article has detailed the operations carried out by ECOWAS within Liberia and Sierra Leone, establishing the difficult situation faced by such population, which demanded action. Besides, it pointed out that Nigeria played a very important role in both domestic conflicts as it was the country that has received the duty of carrying out the agenda for peace. However, it was explicit through the reading that Nigeria has done even more that it was asked to, vested by ECOMOGS and even supported by ECOWAS, due to its personal interest in the region -mainly trying to be seen as the principal force of Africa.
Although the international organisms, specially the UN Security Council, have completely validated its actions a posteriori, based in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter along with the powers granted by Chapter VII, it was important to mention the private agendas carried out along with the peace enforcing and peacekeeping operations in order to address the international responsibility matter.
More precisely, it has been presented that normally international organizations are held fully responsible for the actions carried out by its State-members in action during the conflict, even though such illegal acts were not committed as prescribed by the mandates.
Thus, what was tried to show is that, if following an abuse perpetrated by a member-State while acting with autonomy and independence, that is, in full control, this country should be the one held responsible, instead of the (regional) international organization, as it is a clear abuse of its legal personality. Unfortunately, based on the ILC Articles, this is not yet possible -being this the reason why a change or a new interpretation should be made: in order to prevent atrocities from happening during situations that were actually meant to overcome a time of difficulty, and, which unfortunately are flourishing within the framework of international institutions.
